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Recent Cases
LANDLORD AND TENANT-TENANTABLE CONDITION
OF PREMISES-RELATION OF LANDLORD'S
STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS TO COMMON LAW
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831
(Mass. 1973)
The movement to restructure landlord-tenant law, at one time
a cause championed only by legal commentators,' has secured
a position in the mainstream of legal thought. Both legislative en-
actments2 and a growing body of case law3 bear witness to the de-
velopment of an emerging consensus that the continued application
of feudal concepts of land tenure to the modem residential tenancy
consistently produces inequitable results. The solution offered by
the reformers has been the replacement of a traditional property
law analysis of lease obligations with an approach keyed to contract
doctrine.4 In the transition, however, contract analysis has appar-
ently begun to assume in the judicial mind a certain talismanic qual-
ity. "Contract" has become more a reflex response than a route to
well-reasoned resolution of landlord-tenant disputes in the courts.
Up to now, this development has not significantly reduced the im-
mediate impact of recent decisions, but such goal-oriented jurisprd-
ence raises serious doubts as to the ultimate value of case law in im-
proving the condition of the residential tenant. The available evi-
dence demonstrates that it may hinder the construction of an orderly
1. See, e.g., Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Con-
tract, 16 TExAs L. REv. 47 (1937); Friedman, The Nature of a Lease in New
York, 33 CoRNELL L.Q. 165 (1947); Note, The California Lease-Contract
or Conveyance?, 4 STAN. L. REv. 244 (1952).
2. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-347a through h (1969); MxcH.
CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 125.530, .534 (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-
79 (Supp. 1974). See Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf
of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution
Policy, 80 Y.AL L.J. 1093, 1194 n.124 (1971), for an exhaustive list of
pertinent statutes.
3. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d
616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii
426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. 1973).
4. Id.
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sequence of precedents. In their haste to apply contract doctrine,
some courts have delivered decisions that are too broad for the nar-
row fact situations presented for adjudication. 5 Others have clothed
their decisions in the vocabulary of reform only to resolve issues ac-
cording to strict property theory.6
The frequent appearance of such errors compels a critical scru-
tiny of landlord-tenant cases for adherence to sound common law
analysis7 and conceptual accuracy in the property-contract debate.
Perhaps, though, the most significant question to be answered by
such an inquiry is whether courts, which profess to be sympathetic
to the tenants' cause, have misdirected their efforts by opting for a
thoroughgoing contract analysis of the residential lease.8
5. See, e.g., Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wise. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961);
45 MARQ. L. REv. 630 (1962). In Pines the court implied a warranty of hab-
itability into a lease when no such innovation was required by the facts of the
case. The premises were furnished and leased for immediate occupancy; thus,
the case should have been governed by the exception to the rule of caveat emp-
tor for furnished premises rented "for immediate residence." This rule was
set forth in Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892), a case cited
in Pines. 14 Wisc. 2d at 595, 111 N.W.2d at 412. Furthermore, there was
evidence in Pines of an express warranty, which should have made any refer-
ence to an implied warranty unnecessary. Moreover, since the tenants had
abandoned the premises, the case could have been based on constructive evic-
tion, rather than breach of an implied warranty. See also Lemle v. Breeden,
51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Marini v. Ireland, 56 NJ. 130, 265 A.2d
526 (1969). The Wisconsin Supreme Court itself may have impliedly discred-
ited Pines by not citing it in a later action for rent where the tenant's defense
was violations of the housing code. Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wisc. 2d 172, 174
N.W.2d 528 (1970).
6. See, e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Ma-
rini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1969).
7. See generally Speech of Dean Roscoe Pound, University of Cincinnati
Conference on "The Status of the Rule of Judicial Precedent," Feb. 17, 1940,
in 14 U. CN. L. REv. 324 (1940). See also H. HART & A. SACKS, Tim LEGAL
PROCESS 366-68 (1958). The fundamental notion of these commentators is
that the expression of societal objectives by the judiciary should be no more
than an incident of the duty to adjudicate fairly: "Conscious reshaping must
• . . hold the degree of movement down to the degree to which need truly
presses." K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 157 (2d ed. 1951).
8. The need for close scrutiny is further intensified by the national im-
pact which many landlord-tenant cases have had. For example, a New York
court has already stated that Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), is "destined . . . to be
a landmark decision." Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 21, 318
N.Y.S.2d 11, 18 (New York City Civ. Ct. 1971). Javins is also cited as
strong support in many other recent state decisions. Green v. Superior Court,
10 Cal. 3d 616, 623, 517 P.2d 1168, 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708 (1974);
Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 841-42 (Mass.
1973); Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Minn. 1973).
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One recent judicial attempt to come to terms with the needs of
the modem residential tenant is Boston Housing Authority v. Hem-
ingway.9 After repeated requests that the landlord, the Boston
Housing Authority, repair defects which made their units in a public
housing project uninhabitable, tenants Ruth Hemingway and Ruth
Briggs began withholding rent.'0 The landlord, a municipal hous-
ing agency," then instituted proceedings in the Municipal Court of
Roxbury to recover possession and rent due under the terms of the
lease.' 2
The tenants pleaded in defense that their failure to pay rent was
consistent with the rent withholding statute of Massachusetts.' s
They alleged that there were defects on their premises that con-
stituted violations of the Massachusetts State Sanitary Code' 4 and
that these violations thad, in turn, been certified by the Boston Hous-
ing Inspection Division as sufficient to invoke the statute.15 Alter-
natively, the tenants pleaded a breach of an implied warranty of
habitability by the landlord. 16
The trial court, sitting -without a jury, rejected both defenses and
granted the landlord possession of the premises as well as a judgment
for the rent due under the lease. .7 Pursuant to a special common
law right, the tenants obtained a trial de novo before the Su-
9. 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973).
10. Id. at 835.
11. MAss. Gmr. LAws ANN. ch. 121, § 26K (1969); see note 97 infra.
12. 293 N.E.2d at 835.
13. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 239, § 8A (Supp. 1974).
14. The code violations alleged in Hemingway included leaky ceilings, wet
walls, improper heating, broken doors and windows, and infestation by rodents
and other vermin. 293 N.E.2d at 835 n.2. The provisions of the State Sani-
tary Code in issue in Hemingway are contained in Article 1I, "Minimum Stand-
ards of Fitness for Human Habitation." Angevine & Taube, Enforcement of
Public Health Laws-Some New Techniques, 52 MAss. L.Q. 205, 207 (1967).
Article II is the Massachusetts counterpart of the Housing Regulations of the
District of Columbia which were involved in Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
15. 293 N.E.2d at 835. MAsS. G N. LAws ANN. ch. 239, § 8A (Supp.
1974), requires that violations of the Code must "endanger or materially im-
pair the health or safety, and the well-being of any tenant therein or persons
occupying the premises . . . ." This finding must be made, as it was in
Hemingway, by the report of a housing inspector.
16. 293 N.E.2d at 835.
17. Id. The full impact of the court's holding was felt only by defendant
Hemingway. Defendant Briggs had vacated her apartment before the judicially
mandated eviction; hence, her appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court was based
solely on the judgment for the rent owed. Id. at 835 n.3.
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perior Court of Suffolk County.' 8 They again pleaded the rent with-
holding statute in defense and -requested a ruling that, regardless of
the statute, .the conditions of the dwelling constituted a breach of the
landlord's obligation to provide a dwelling in compliance with the
provisions of the Sanitary Code.19 They argued that this breach
should be a defense to an -action for summary eviction and that the
extent of the breach, and not the terms of -the lease, should determine
the amount of compensation due the landlord for the occupancy of
the premises during the period of withholding.20 The Superior Court
did not reach these issues; rather, it held that the failure of the ten-
ants to give the landlord notice of their intention to withhold rent,
in the manner required by the statute, was dispositive. 21 The court
therefore affirmed the eviction and the award given by the original
trial court.22
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts agreed
that the eviction was proper, but stated that "in a rental of any prem-
ises for dwelling purposes, under a written or oral lease, for a spe-
cified time or at will, there is an implied warranty that the premises
are fit for human occupation." 23  Consequently, the tenants were
forced to surrender possession, but were obligated to pay only the
reasonable rental value of the premises for the period of occupancy.
A minority of the court set forth a persuasive concurring-dissent-
ing opinion, 24 in which it agreed with the conclusion of the majority
on the question of eviction, but argued that the wiser alternative to a
common law warranty of habitability was the more predictable ap-
18. Appeal of actions involving summary process is to the superior court,
where trial de novo may be obtained. Di Natali v. Jackson, 43 Mass. App.
Dec. 212 (1970). When a tenant appeals a decision on summary eviction a
bond for rent owed must be paid into court. MAss. GN. L.Aws ANN. ch. 239,
§ 5 (Supp. 1974).
19. 293 N.E.2d at 843-45.
20. Id. at 836.
21. When first enacted, Massachusetts General Laws ch. 239, § 8A
required the tenant to give written notice to the landlord clearly stating his
intention to withhold rent pursuant to the inspection report. This requirement
has since been amended to permit the Housing Inspection Department
that conducted the inspection to satisfy the notice requirement by written no-
tice to the landlord of all violations. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, § 8A
(Supp. 1974). See 293 N.E.2d at 836 n.5.
22. In reaching this conclusion, both lower courts rejected the existence
of any common law warranty of habitability in Massachusetts and reaffirmed
the property principle of independent covenants. 293 N.E.2d at 835. See also
Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 124 N.E. 283 (1919).
23. 293 N.E.2d at 843.
24. The vote of the Hemingway court was 4 to 3.
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proach of implying the standards of the existing Sanitary Code of
Massachusetts into the residential lease as the absolute index of the
landlord's obligations. 25
The assumption that any effective assault on the property theory
of the residential tenancy must take place on two fronts, those of the
doctrine of caveat emptor and the rule of independent covenants,
pervades both the majority and minority opinions. This assump-
tion was explicitly adopted in the leading case of the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals in Javins v. First National Realty Corp.26
The Javins court abandoned the application of property concepts to
the residential lease and concluded: "In our judgment, the trend
toward treating leases as contracts is wise and well-considered. Our
holding in this case reflects a belief that leases of urban dwelling
units should be interpreted and construed like any other contract."2 7
25. 293 N.E.2d at 853.
26. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
27. 428 F.2d at 1075. The issue of whether the landlord had a contrac-
tual duty to maintain the premises was squarely presented in Javins. The court
held that there existed, through the vehicle of an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity, an obligation on the part of the landlord of a residential dwelling to rent
only habitable premises and to maintain those premises in good repair for the
duration of the lease. The court also held that a tenant who withheld rent
pursuant to the violation of the landlord's duty to provide habitable premises
could not be evicted provided he paid the reasonable value of the premises
when a court so ordered. Id. at 1083. Paradoxically, while both the majority
and minority opinions in Hemingway purport to rely on the Javins approach,
neither opinion would permit the tenant to retain possession of the premises
under the same circumstances. 293 N.E.2d at 843, 845, 854. See notes 78-
107 infra and accompanying text. It is the impact of this judicially formulated
remedy which ultimately leads the majority in Hemingway to remark that its
holding is "far less radical" than that of Javins. Id. at 842 n.ll.
Apparently, the Hemingway court feels that its holding is more firmly
grounded in the statutory and common law of its jurisdiction than was Javins.
The legislature of Massachusetts had given every indication that it favored lib-
eral tenant remedies by the passage of remedial statutes. Moreover, the basis
for an implied warranty had been laid in the common law of Massachusetts
by the case of Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). Ingalls
established the exception to the rule of caveat emptor when the premises in-
volved were furnished and therefore prepared "for immediate residence." 156
Mass. at 350, 31 N.E. at 286.
[There are good reasons why a different rule should apply to one
who hires a furnished room ... . Its fitness for immediate use...
is a far more important element entering into the contract than when
there is a mere lease of real estate. . . . An important part of what
the [tenant] pays for is the opportunity to enjoy it without delay,
and without the expense of preparing it for use.
Id. In the context of Ingalls, the Hemingway court seems to view the common
law implied warranty as simply "an idea whose time has come." Indeed, the
Hemingway majority describes the implied warranty as extending to all prem-
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Under the traditional property theory the tenant bargained only
for an estate in land; the landlord had no obligation beyond the duty
to deliver possession. 28 If, on the other hand, the lease transaction
is analyzed under contract theory, the resulting obligations are de-
fined in terms of the expectations of the parties to that contract.2 9
Javins states that those expectations extend to a "well known package
of goods and services."3 0  The Hemingway majority similarly con-
cludes that the landlord's obligation is "to deliver and maintain the
premises in habitable condition." 3' The common denominator is
plain. The landlord must provide, first, a physical space, and sec-
ond, a physical space that is habitable. The issue -that splits the
Hemingway court is the relationship between the implied warranty
of habitability and the existing Sanitary Code.32 The majority in
Hemingway asserts not only that code violations can exist that do
not constitute substantial breaches of the landlord's obligations, but
that there are conditions or defects that affect habitability which
may not be included in the code.83 The Hemingway minority, how-
ises leased for "immediate occupation"--a phrase nearly identical to that used
by the Ingalls court. 293 N.E.2d at 838. It should be noted that Ingalls has
become a popular vehicle for courts dealing with landlord-tenant disputes.
Javins used Ingalls to justify its decision. 428 F.2d at 1078. One of the most
recent landlord-tenant cases concludes: "Our decision today may be seen as
a logical development of the common law principles embodied in the Ingalls
decision." Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 626-27 n.11, 517 P.2d
1168, 1174-75 n.11, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 710-11 n.11 (1974).
28. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3.45, 3.78 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
Even under property theory, the covenant to pay rent was dependent on the
delivery of possession to the lessee. It was this exchange-payment for a con-
veyance-that was the essence of the lease transaction. Even this obligation
was not absolute, however, if the inability to give possession resulted from the
conduct of a third person. See, e.g., Teitelbaum v. Direct Realty Co., 172
Misc. 48, 13 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
29. See note 37 infra.
30. 428 F.2d at 1074.
31. 293 N.E.2d at 842.
32. Javins states that the implied warranty is "measured by the standards
set out in the housing regulations for the District of Columbia." 428 F.2d
at 1072. The conflict over the use of existing housing standards as the meas-
ure of the warranty may obscure its importance as a prime motivation for im-
plying a warranty of habitability in the first instance. See id. at 1079; note
36 infra and accompanying text. On its face, Javins appears to follow the rea-
soning of the minority in Hemingway; that legislative enactments are at least
determinative of the "outer limits" of the implied warranty of habitability in
that there are no penumbral violations of the implied warranty lying outside
the terms of the statute. 428 F.2d at 1080, 1081 n.57. However, the Javins
court concludes that certain breaches of the housing code may also be de mini-
mis. 428 F.2d at 1082 n.63.
33. 293 N.E.2d at 851.
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ever, posits that the Sanitary Code is controlling and that any viola-
tion of its provisions therefore is a material breach of the landlord's
obligations. 34
The majority in Hemingway builds its case for the common law
implied warranty of habitability on an analysis of legislative intent.
It treats the existing set of standards embodied in -the Sanitary Code
as a springboard for development of the common law; these statutory
standards are considered by the court to be evidence that the legis-
lature favored the development of some set of standards for housing
maintenance. As such, the statutory standards represent a "policy
judgment"3 5 of the legislature and provide a set of "threshold re-
quirements" with which "the protection afforded by the implied war-
ranty or [sic] habitability does not necessarily coincide . . .,,6
From the standpoint of contract doctrine, the disdain of the ma-
jority for the technical requirements of the Sanitary Code as the
standard for the implied warranty seems well-advised. In order to
give rise to the duty of reciprocal performance, an implied covenant
need only be substantially or materially performed, unlike an ex-
press covenant, which must be literally and technically carried out.37
34. See notes 44-46 infra and accompanying text.
35. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wise. 2d 590, 595-96, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412
(1961), cited in Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831,
843 (Mass. 1973).
36. 293 N.E.2d at 844 n.16; see id. at 841 n.10: "[R]emedial legislation
designed to promote safe and sanitary housing does not preclude the courts
from fashioning new common law rights and remedies to facilitate the policy
of safe and sanitary housing embodied in the [rent] withholding statutes." But
cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972): "Absent constitutional man-
date, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant
relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions." For a statute which con-
tains a warranty of habitability obligation as well as a duty to comply with
a housing or health code, see Omo RPv. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.04(1)-(2) (Bald-
win Supp. 1974).
37. L. FULLER & M. EisENBERo, BASIC CoNTRAcr LAw 664-65 (1970); 5
S. WrLLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF Cotmxcrs § 675 (3d ed. W.
Jaeger 1963) [hereinafter cited as WLLISTON]. The notion that the implied
warranty of habitability is a warranty implied in law is well-camouflaged in
most cases. The cases typically make reference to the expectations of the par-
ties, which is characteristic of an implied in fact contract; but they also cite
the requirement of substantial performance, which is inherent in an implied-
in-law contract. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071,
1081 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Boston Housing Author-
ity v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 842 (Mass. 1973).
The key to the problem may lie in the close relationship of the implied
warranty of habitability and the warranty of merchantability. In one sense
the implied warranty of merchantability is what the parties intended to bargain
for. See Haskell, The Case For an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of
1975]
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The Massachusetts rent withholding statute also appears to contain
a materiality standard.38 Thus, a breach of the implied warranty
cannot be founded on intolerance with minor problems. 39 Further-
more, the mere existence of a housing or health code cannot guar-
antee any absolute answer to the question of the extent of breach
since the materiality of a breach is a question of fact.40  The ma-
jority opinion sets forth a number of factors significant in determin-
ing the extent of the breach; 41 however, in doing so, it emphasizes
that the only way to ensure justice is by ad hoc adjudication.4 2
Real Property, 53 GEo. L.J. 635, 652 (1962). In another sense, the warranty
is too crucial to be based on the intent or expectations of the parties. See
Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use, 16 RUTrGEs L.
Rv. 493, 503 (1962). The end result is that the implied-in-law character of
the warranty predominates. It would appear that this situation parallels that
of the implied warranty of habitability: "It is precisely such expectations that
the law now recognizes as deserving of formal, legal protection." 428 F.2d
at 1079. But see 6 WLLISTON § 890A.
38. See note 15 supra.
39. Academy Spires, Inc. v. Jones, 108 NJ. Super. 395, 403, 261 A.2d 413,
417 (1970): "The warranty is one of habitability and is not a warranty
against all inconvenience or discomfort."
40. See 293 N.E.2d at 843. The court appears to focus on the inadequacy
of a housing code as a tool for evaluating actual uninhabitability. As one com-
mentator has remarked, "A housing code cannot provide for every safeguard;
nor is compliance with every one of its technical provisions necessary for a
habitable dwelling." Note, Implied Warranties and Rent Withholding in Ur-
ban Leases, 66 Nw. U.L. Rav. 227, 242 (1971).
41. T)he criteria set out by the Hemingway court include: (1) the serious-
ness of the claimed defects; (2) the length of time the defects persisted; (3)
whether the landlord or his agents received written or oral notice of the de-
fects; (4) the possibility that the premises could be made habitable within a
reasonable time; (5) whether the defects resulted from the conduct of the ten-
ant. 293 N.E.2d at 843-44. See also Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii 473, 476,
462 P.2d 482, 484 (1969); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Iowa
1972); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 93, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1972).
42. The trial court must have the same broad discretion to determine
whether there is a material breach given the special circumstances of
each case as that accorded the board of health under Reg. 39 of the
Code which allows the board to vary the application of any provision
with respect to a particular case.
293 N.E.2d at 844 n.16.
The majority seems to advocate a flexible habitability standard based on
the needs and expectations of both tenants and landlords. For example, breach
of the warranty may be material if the tenant is aged or disabled; but the same
breach when the tenant is young and healthy may not be considered material.
Likewise, the materiality of the breach may depend, to some extent, on factors
external to the breach itself: for example, the financial position of the land-
lord. Indeed, once the warranty of habitability is implied into the lease, it
is logical to allow courts to enforce that standard in a flexible manner. See
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081 n.56 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Reese v. Diamond Housing Corp., 259 A.2d
112, 113 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
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The minority presents a convincing rebuttal to the legislative in-
tent argument by alluding to a cardinal rule of statutory construction.
There is no better evidence of legislative intent than the words of
the statute enacted. 43 In fact, the minority contends, the compre-
hensiveness of the standards in .the Sanitary Code effectively under-
mines any suggestion that the code is merely an indication of a
vague policy decision. 44 The minority supports its argument for the
implication of existing statutes and health regulations into leases with
a formidable body of case law.45  In the process, the minority de-
feats the majority's contention that the open-ended implied warranty
of habitability is favored by the great preponderance of judicial de-
cisions, and concludes that the scope of the implied warranty in the
43. 293 N.E.2d at 848; see, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470, 485-86 (1916); Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 419, 421 (1899).
44. 293 N.E.2d at 848, 851. The State Sanitary Code provision appears
in MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 127A (1966). It should be noted that
the Code provision was formerly located elsewhere in the General Laws, but
was relocated in the section of the Code that sets forth the initial tenant rem-
edies in Massachusetts. 293 N.E.2d at 839 n.6. This could conceivably be
viewed as evidence that the code was to be the exclusive standard for those
tenant remedies and all such remedies subsequently enacted by the legislature,
as well as any judicially developed remedies.
By looking further behind the words of the statute, a very practical justifi-
cation for defining the limits of the statutory rent-withholding provisions ac-
cording to the Sanitary Code becomes evident. This argument is based on the
most fundamental kind of legislative intent: that statutes enacted be put to
use. Many statutes and sets of regulations similar to the Massachusetts Sani-
tary Code were enacted to implement programs designed to achieve better
housing through the application of public sanctions-the so-called public code
enforcement strategy. The failure of such efforts is well-documented. Jack-
son v. Rivera, 65 Misc. 2d 468, 470, 3-18 N.Y.S.2d 7, 9-10 (New York City
Civ. Ct. 1971); see Angevine & Taube, supra note 14, at 217. See generally
Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 1254 (1966); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing
Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801 (1965). When these programs stalled, efforts
were redirected toward the development of private remedies. 293 N.E.2d at
839. The crux of the argument, then, is that the goal to which the codes were
directed-the improvement of housing-is identical to the goal of the private
remedy effort. Thus it would only be logical to use the same standards. More-
over, because of the demise of the code enforcement effort, the statutory stand-
ards must be utilized in the private remedy area simply to justify their con-
tinued existence. To fail to do so would "reduce the statute to an empty,
meaningless form of words." Jackson v. Rivera, 65 Misc. 2d at 471, 318
N.Y.S.2d at 10.
45. 293 N.E.2d at 852-53; see Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co.,
282 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1960); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 IlM. 2d 351, 280
N.E.2d 208 (1972); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 325, 323
N.Y.S.2d 363 (New York City Civ. Ct. 1971). See also Schosinski, Remedies
of the Indigent Tenant: Proposals for Change, 54 Guo. L.. 519, 523 (1966).
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case before it is limited to the standards set forth in the Code. 46
Thus a breach of any provision of the Code is inherently a sub-
stantial breach of the landlord's obligations.
The majority's position that the warranty of habitability should
be expanded to include defects not explictly covered by the statute
ignores the practical need of the tenant for a fixed standard. Be-
cause of the inherent vulnerability of the tenant, it is necessary to
offer him a certain amount of predictability of result before he will
resort to any private remedy.47 The flexibility of ad hoc adjudica-
tion cannot, in the eyes of the tenant, compensate for its inlierent
uncertainty. Nor, for that matter, can it compensate for the extra-
neous costs of litigation which necessarily accumulate with the pas-
sage of time.48 Moreover, though the plight of the tenant is typically
46. Although some of the decisions on which the court seems to place
its greatest reliance include in their discussions general language
about the implication of a warranty of habitability, it is clear from
the express language of their holdings that they imply a warranty of
habitability which is limited to the minimum standards prescribed by
applicable statutes, ordinances, by-laws, codes, rules and regulations.
293 N.E.2d at 852; see Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 71, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 661, 666 (1972). But see Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii 473, 476,
462 P.2d 482, 484 (1969). A survey of case law reveals, in fact, only one
case, Kline v. Massachusetts Ave. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
that has imposed an implied warranty obligating the landlord without reference
to an existing statute. The issue before the court in Kline was the liability
of a landlord for failure to provide a dwelling in which tenants were secure
from attacks. There the court concluded that the landlord's duty to protect
the tenant stems from "the logic of the situation." Id. at 483.
47. In using almost any common law private remedy, the tenant is gam-
bling with his right to possession. This course is evident in the common law
rent withholding remedy formulated in Hemingway. To a lesser extent the
same risk is present in applying the Javins-style remedy. In Javins there is
no requirement of inspection by housing officials to determine whether the al-
leged defect is in violation of the housing code. By allowing the tenant the
luxury of deciding for himself whether his dwelling is uninhabitable, Javins ex-
poses the tenant to the possibility that he may be forced to surrender posses-
sion if he withholds rent when there are no violations of the housing code or
when the existing violations do not constitute a substantial breach. 428 F.2d
1082 n.62. In addition, eviction would occur if the tenant failed to pay the
amount owed after appropriate deductions for unsuitable conditions.
48. In Hemingway, the defects complained of developed some time before
the beginning of rent withholding by the tenants. The decision of the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was delivered more than 4 years af-
ter the defects became apparent. On its face, this is a drastic example be-
cause of the lengthy appeal process. However, if the implied warranty is to
be applied on a case-by-case basis, this would, in itself, encourage appeals of
adverse judgments, because of the uncertainty of the issue. This problem has
been somewhat alleviated by legislative developments. If the Hemingway
case were pursued today, it would fall under the jurisdiction of the recently
created Boston Housing Court. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 185A, §§ 1, 3
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the focus of discussions of proposed remedies, the landlord is simi-
larly disadvantaged by the common law warranty. He is placed in
the precarious position of having an obligation to perform and never
knowing for certain the extent to which he has met his obligation.
An examination of the motivation of the Hemingway court, more-
over, reveals that there is no compelling reason for exposing the
tenant or the landlord to such problems. The court suggests that its
only purpose is -to resolve some perceived inconsistency between
statutory and common law.49 The court apparently felt the need to
remove any vestiges of traditional property law doctrine to destroy
this "illogical state." 50  It is doubtful whether the resolution of this
inconsistency is justified in view of the probable ill effects on the
principals involved in a residential tenancy.
The majority compounds the problem of uncertainty by re-
marking: "This warranty (insofar as it is based on the State Sani-
tary Code and local health regulations) cannot be waived by any
provision in the lease or rental agreement." 51 On its face, this state-
ment prohibits the use of waiver. In the interstices, however, there
is room to evade the prohibition. A careful reading of the statement
reveals that it contains an implication that there can be a waiver
of substantial defects affecting habitability if the defects are not
covered by the Code or other regulations.
The position of waivers at law is not a favored one.5 2 Generally,
the party waiving a right must do so intentionally and with knowledge
(Supp. 1974). The procedural rules there insure a much quicker disposition
of housing controversies. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 185A, §§ 20-30
(Supp. 1974). The housing court statute did not become effective until Janu-
ary 1, 1972, after the Hemingway case had begun appeal procedures.
49. General Laws c. 111, §§ 127A-127F and 127H, and G.L. c. 239,
8A, have already encroached to some degree on the common law
rules of caveat emptor and independent covenants. If we fail to re-
pudiate the underlying common law concept of a lease which fostered
the independent covenants rule, the landlord-tenant law in Massachu-
setts will remain in an illogical state because our statutory and com-
mon law will be based on different conceptual assumptions as to the
essential nature and consequences of a lease.
293 N.E.2d at 843.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Waivers are not presumed, and the burden of proof for one attempting
to prove the existence of a waiver apparently extends beyond the normal
standard of a preponderance of the evidence. "The assent [necessary to es-
tablish a waiver] must ... be clearly established and will not be inferred
from doubtful or equivocal acts or language." Carfi v. DeMartino, 181 Misc.
428, 431, 46 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (Sup. Ct. 1944). See also Brandt v. Roxana
Petroleum Corp., 29 F.2d 980, 982 (5th Cir. 1929).
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of the right waived. 53 Because of the uncertainty that surrounds an
implied warranty, it seems difficult to justify the waiver of such a
right.5'4 Waivers are even more suspect when they are invoked in an
area such as housing, which is affected with the interests of society
as a whole. 55 Finally, although there is no provision prohibiting
waiver of common law tenant rights, there is a clear statutory policy
against waivers in this area of the law.56
The negative attitude of the courts and legislatures toward waiv-
ers might protect tenants from the implication that can be drawn
from the language used in Hemingway. One might speculate that
the anti-waiver prejudice is so strong that, even though the Heming-
way opinion leaves room for waivers, no court would consider im-
plying a waiver under any circumstances. But the possible preser-
vation of waiver in Hemingway may overcome the judicial bias,
since it is to that decision and not to waiver cases in other areas that
courts will look for precedent in deciding landlord-tenant cases. The
possibility that an express waiver provision might be enforced makes
the position of the tenant significantly more uncertain.
In effect, the majority is willing to permit waiver of non-statutory
breaches of the warranty as a trade-off for a standard of habitability
which extends beyond that offered by statute. 57 The danger of this
tactic, however, is that the flexibility of ad hoe adjudication does
not necessarily operate in the tenant's favor. If a landlord can pos-
sibly save an otherwise invalid waiver provision by showing that it is
not addressed to specific housing or health code provisions, he will
almost surely attempt to establish in litigation that the defect com-
plained of does not fall within the terms of a code provision, how-
ever minimal or literal the divergence from the code provision may
53. A waiver is defined as a "voluntary relinquishment of a known right."
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 297, comment b (1932).
54. A person clearly cannot waive a right he does not know he possesses.
Werking v. Amity Estates, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 43, 52, 155 N.Y.S.2d 633, 642, 137
N.E.2d 321, 327 (1956). "[I]n the absence of an express agreement a waiver
will not be presumed or implied contrary to the intention of the party whose
rights would be injuriously affected thereby .... ." Universal Gas Co. v.
Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 102 F.2d 164, 168 (7th Cir. 1939).
55. "Where a private right is granted in the public interest to effectuate
a legislative policy, waiver of a right so charged or colored with the public
interest will not be allowed where it would thwart the legislative policy which
it was designed to effectuate." Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697,
704 (1945).
56. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 127K (1966). See also Buck-
ner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 1015, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967).
57. See 293 N.E. at 846, 851.
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be. Thus, the common law implied warranty of habitability de-
veloped by the majority could easily be distorted into an exercise in
hair-splitting. This, in turn, might result in a standard of habitability
that would be, in fact, less stringent than that originally established
by the Sanitary Code.
This does not mean that a similar contest would not ensue if the
Sanitary Code were the sole standard of habitability, as the minor-
ity would hold. Indeed, proving that a defect does not fall within
the terms of the Code is a more direct escape route for the landlord,
since the question of waiver never arises. However, this route may
be blocked because the courts are accustomed to dealing with such
evasive tactics. Under the majority approach, though, the courts
might well be baffled by the landlord's new strategy of admitting a
breach of the warranty of habitability, only to prove that the breach
lies beyond the scope of a housing or health code and is therefore
subject to an express waiver contained in the lease.
From the standpoint of the defendants in Hemingway, the com-
mon law warranty of habitability provided some unexpected relief,
while at the same time disappointing the rightful expectations of the
landlord--expectations built on clear statutory language. However,
prospects for neither landlord nor tenant are particularly bright un-
der the warranty. The landlord has a new area of responsibility,
while the tenant possesses what is perhaps the least desirable of all
remedies-the opportunity to win a lawsuit. The minority perhaps
best captures the potential danger of the common law implied war-
ranty in referring to it as a "presently undefined, indeterminable and
uncharted area of potential rights and liabilities of landlords and
tenants . . . [which may] serve only to vex them and to produce
litigation otherwise avoidable." 58
Although the majority and the minority of the Hemingway court
disagree on the source of the obligation to be imposed on the land-
lord, this disagreement does not disturb the consensus of the court as
to the limited remedies available to a tenant whose landlord has,
in fact, breached his obligation to maintain the premises. Histori-
cally, under the property theory of independent covenants, no breach
by the landlord of .any covenant could be pleaded in defense to an
action to evict for failure to pay rent; the only strategy available to
the tenant was to litigate his complaints in a separate action while
meeting his obligations under the lease.59
58. Id. at 852; see Comment, The Implied Warranty of Fitness and Hab-
itability, 16 ViL.. L. Rv. 710 (1971).
59. 1 AMmcAN LAiw OF PROPERTY, supra note 28, § 3.11.
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There was one exception to this rule. Between the two coven-
ants most essential to the lease transaction, the landlord's covenant
to deliver possession and the tenant's covenant to pay rent, there
existed a relationship of dependency; the breach of one such cove-
nant would relieve the wronged party from the duty of performing
the other.60 If, however, the landlord has two essential covenants
to perform-transfer of possessory rights and maintenance by virtue
of an implied warranty of habitability61-the remedies available to the
tenant should be substantially 'the same upon the breach of either of
these covenants. If the tenant can either -plead the breach of the
landlord's covenant to transfer possession in defense to an action to
recover rent or institute a separate action for damages, he should have
a similar option when the landlord fails to maintain the premises in a
habitable condition. 62  It is this reasoning, often unspoken, that
has led many modem courts, including Hemingway, to reject the
property law's independent covenant analysis and to apply the con-
tract rule of dependent covenants to the lease agreement. 63 This
rule of dependent covenants raises ,habitability to a new dignity.
According to this concept, the tenant's obligation to pay rent under
the lease is conditional upon the landlord's performance of his own
obligations.6 4  The failure of the landlord to perform substantially
the essential incidents of the residential lease transaction permits the
tenant to withhold the performance of his obligation.
Unfortunately, while the judicial effort to elevate habitability to
a realistic level of importance through the rule of dependent cove-
nants had as its objective the establishment of a parity between the
two essential covenants, it 'has resulted in a corresponding under-
emphasis of the most basic and immediate need of the tenant. Al-
though efforts to improve the quality of rental housing are laudable,
the primary concern of the typical residential tenant has been and
continues to be the acquisition and retention of possession.6" Though
he wants a dwelling that is habitable, the tenant will invariably ac-
cept less when a habitable dwelling is not available.6 6  The resi-
60. 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 686 (1951) [hereinafter cited aa CORBIN].
61. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
62. 3A CoaBIN § 655.
63. See note 3 supra.
64. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 429 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); 3A CORBIN §§ 633, 637.
65. Loeb, The Low-Income Tenant in California: A Study in Frustration,
21 HASTINGS L. REv. 287, 302 (1970).
66. Housing statistics show that many substandard units are occupied de-
spite their apparent unsuitability for habitation. The REPORT OF THE NA-
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dential tenant is often not even aware of the unsuitability of his
dwelling until a "crisis in uninhabitabilty"67 occurs. Intrinsically,
habitability is contingent upon the existence and availability of a
physical space. Habitability is a quality of that space, and therefore,
it is necessarily collateral to the right to possess the space. In spite
of judicial over-reaction against feudal tenurial concepts, 68 the right
to possess a physical space remains the essence of the residential
tenancy, primarily because the tight housing market dictates that
result. 69
By their literal terms most recent decisions have disclaimed this
idea. Rather, these courts have asserted that it is habitability and
not possession that constitutes the most significant portion of the
lease transaction.70 Hemingway is among this group." 1 It may well
be, however, that this emphasis on the service obligation is partially
a device to ensure that the warranty of habitability will be legally
recognized as an essential part of the lease, and that the breach of
this warranty will give rise to the normal contract remedies. The
results reached by most courts which have elevated the status of
habitability are certainly not consistent with the idea that the pos-
sessory interest has ceased to be a crucial element in the modem
residential tenancy. These courts have actually recognized the im-
portance of the possessory interest 'by refusing to condition the ten-
ant's remedies for breach upon surrender of possession. The relief
granted by the courts has been the monetary difference between the
value of the "goods" as warranted (measured ,by the contract price)
TIONAL ADVISORY COMIMSSION ON Civi. Diso.DEas 257 (1965) stated that the
number of substandard housing units at the time of publication was approxi-
mately six million. A more recent estimate placed the figure at 11 million.
J. FRm, HOusING CRisIS U.S.A. 10 (1971).
67. Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban Society,
46 J. oF URBAN LAw 695, 699 (1969).
68. This sentiment reached its height in Green v. Superior Court, 10
Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974). The court stated:
'Today the habitability of the dwelling unit has become the very essence of
the residential lease." 10 Cal. 3d at 635, 517 P.2d at 1180-81, 111 Cal. Rptr.
at 716-17. It is interesting to note, however, that to follow this statement to
its logical conclusion is to state that possession of uninhabitable premises is
worthless-a fiction that is the basis of constructive eviction. See notes 91-
94 infra and accompanying text; Schoshinski, supra note 45, at 527; cf. Jay-
ins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
69. See note 109 infra and accompanying text.
70. Schier, Protecting the Interests of the Indigent Tenant: Two Ap-
proaches, 54 CALiF. L. Rnv. 670, 690.
71. "[Rlent is paid for habitable premises and not for an interest in real
estate." 293 N.E.2d at 843.
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and the value of the goods "as is" (measured by the actual value of
the premises). 72
Under this standard of relief the question of eviction pursuant to
rightful rent withholding never arises so long as the tenant pays the
amount of rent the landlord "earned" when the value of the premises
is established by a court.73  Uninhabitability becomes a continuum
along which the extent of the breach decreases the amount of com-
pensation to which the landlord is entitled for the services he per-
formed and the physical space he delivered.7 4  Thus, while recent
decisions are typically described as establishing that the covenant to
pay rent is dependent on the habitability of the premises, the nature
of the relief granted demonstrates that they might be more accurately
characterized as establishing that the amount of rent owed is depend-
ent on the habitability of the premises. The existence of a breach of
the warranty of habitability merely triggers the operation of a setoff
mechanism.7 5 The obligation to pay rent, although perhaps post-
poned by statute, is never voided because, as with a contract for the
sale of goods, breach of the implied warranty rarely reaches a point
where the right to possession is actually worthless. 76 Moreover, as
in the sale or lease of any commodity, objective judgments of worth-
lessness may not be considered dispositive because extraneous fac-
tors, such as market conditions, may make the goods valuable to
72. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See 11 WILLISTON § 1391; UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 2-714.
73. In Javins the problem facing the court was "whether housing code vio-
lations which arise during the term of a lease have any effect on the tenant's
obligation to pay rent." 428 F.2d at 1072. If it was available as a defense
in typical judicial proceedings, there was no question of its availability in sum-
mary actions. The availability of this defense was guaranteed by a rule of
the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Court of General Sessions of Washing-
ton, D.C. 428 F.2d at 1073 n.3.
This particular question was not before the court in Green v. Superior
Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974), where the
question of the dependency of an implied warranty of habitability had already
been settled in the jurisdiction by Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102
Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972). The immediate issue was whether the breach of the
implied warranty could be pleaded in defense of a summary action. The court
held that it was a defense. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 636, 517 P.2d at 1181, 111 Cal.
Rptr. at 717.
74. 428 F.2d at 1083; 293 N.E.2d at 845.
75. 428 F.2d at 1082. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-717.
76. It is difficult to develop a standard to determine the point of worth-
lessness. Javins appears to draw the line at total breach. 428 F.2d at 1083.
The value of this standard is also doubtful,
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the particular purchaser or lessee. 77
It was against this background that the Hemingway court, after
implying a warranty of habitability, returned possession of the prem-
ises to the landlord in spite of his breach of that warranty. The
remedy offered to the tenant was a rescission of the lease contract.78
While this alternative follows as the result of a contractual analysis,
it eliminates any protection of the possessory interest so critical to
the tenants, since rescission traditionally involves returning the con-
tracting parties to the same positions they occupied before the mak-
ing of the contract. 79 The tenant is required to return, to whatever
extent possible, all that he has received under the contract-here,
possession of the premises. The landlord forfeits the difference be-
tween the contract price of the habitable premises and the reasonable
value of the premises "as is" as restitution to the tenant for what is,
in effect, an overpayment for the premises.80
The pattern of events that serves as the basis for the court's rea-
soning may be set out in a temporal sequence: first, the landlord
breaches the implied warranty of habitability; second, the tenant re-
fuses to perform his covenant to pay rent; third, the landlord evicts
the tenant by summary proceeding; fourth, the landlord litigates the
amount of rent due for the period of occupancy. It is the third step
of this sequence that appears to defy explanation under contract
77. See Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases: The Need for Change, 44
DENVER L.J. 387, 391 (1967): "Quite often a long term lease is involved [in
a possible action for rescission] and the demised premises have been selected
for reasons collateral to the issues which may be raised in the rescission ac-
tion."
78. 293 N.E.2d at 843, 845. Both the majority and minority opinions pur-
port to set forth two discrete common law remedies based on dependent cove-
nants. (Each opinion also sets forth a common law independent covenants
remedy. See note 104 infra and accompanying text.) The majority asserts
that the tenant "can sue for rescission" or, if he is willing to suffer eviction,
withhold his rent and pay only the reasonable value for occupancy. 293 N.E.
2d at 843, 845. The minority states that the aggrieved tenant may "termi-
natte] the tenancy" or refuse to pay the agreed rent and subject himself to
eviction. Id. at 854, 853. In fact the remedies provided by the majority are
indistinguishable from those provided by the minority. In practical terms, all
of these remedies assure that the tenant will be homeless, having "exchanged"
his dwelling for the monetary difference between the required rent and the rea-
sonable value of the premises.
79. 12 WmLISTON §§ 1454, 1457.
80. One argument for the validity of rescission theory is that allowing the
tenant to remain in possession in return for the payment of the "reasonable
value" of the premises is tantamount to the judicial creation of a new lease.
293 N.E.2d at 843-45. Cf. Note, Rent Withholding and Improvement of Sub-
standard Housing, 53 CA,.ni. L. Rlv. 304, 331 (1965).
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theory. Theoretically, the landlord's right to take such action should
be restricted to the situation in which the action of the tenant in with-
holding rent is unjustified in view of the nature of the landlord's
breach. Such would be the case only if that breach -were insubstan-
tial or if the covenant so breached were non-essential. If such were
the case, the tenant's sole option would be to perform fully and then
to sue for damages.81  The inconsistency is that, under the Heming-
way holding, the implied warranty is an essential covenant and any
breach of it is necessarily substantial. Thus, the right to withhold
upon breach inheres in any application of contract theory.82
In addition, traditional rescission theory does not justify the se-
quence outlined by the court. No rescission is valid without the res-
toration or offer to restore the goods to the other party to the con-
tract.8 3  Clearly, no such offer is present in Hemingway. Consider-
ing contemporary housing shortages, residential tenants would sel-
dom offer to rescind a lease.8 4 In fact the only election made by the
tenant who fails to follow the statutory rent withholding procedures
is the election to seek out some remedy, the exact nature of which
the tenant himself probably has not determined when 'he decides to
withhold rent. From the election to withhold rent, the Hemingway
court extrapolates, or perhaps more accurately, mandates the "elec-
tion" to rescind.8 5
81. See notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text.
82. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text. If the court estab-
lishes the parity of the implied warranty of habitability with the covenant to
deliver possession, it seems only logical that any breach of the implied war-
ranty should be considered essential. See 293 N.E.2d at 842. It also appears
that any implied warranty is inherently an essential covenant. "A covenant
in a lease can arise by necessary implication from specific language of the
lease or because it is indispensible to carry into effect the purpose of the lease."
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 143, 265 A.2d 526, 533 (1969).
83. 12 WILLISTON § 1460.
84. Schoshinski, supra note 45, at 527:
In line with relief available to a buyer of personal property when the
goods purchased do not conform in breach of an implied warranty
of fitness, a tenant would have the right of rescission, an action for
damages, or both for the loss resulting from the landlord's breach.
Thus, the tenant could abandon the premises without further liability
for rent, but this is not usually the relief desired by the slum tenant
because the housing shortage effectively curtails his freedom of move-
ment.
See also Skillern, supra note 77, at 391.
85. According to Hemingway, the tenant whose statutory rent-withholding
defense prevails is the only tenant who can practically be said to have the
power to make an effective election. The Hemingway court states that if the
statutory defense is actually litigated and the tenant is victorious, he may re-
main in possession by paying the reasonable value of the premises until the
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In effect, the Hemingway court transfers the initiative for re-
scission to the landlord86 and offers him what amounts to an initial,
incontestable satisfaction of his -frustration, if not a major part of
his claim. The landlord, not the tenant, exercises this election.
While it might be inaccurate to label this process legalized retaliatory
eviction,87 it seems clear that it is far from an equitable procedure.
The process through which the landlord is allowed to regain posses-
sion originates, not in the rent withholding of the tenant, but in the
landlord's own wrong in allowing the premises to become ill-suited
for the purposes for which they were rented. It is the landlord's
own wrongful conduct in the first instance that has precipitated his
receipt of a benefit (possession and the opportunity to acquire a
more compliant tenant). The undesirability of such a result is pat-
ent; it can only serve to encourage further wrongful conduct. At no
point in the process does the Hemingway court assure the repair of
uninhabitable housing even after the departure of the aggrieved ten-
ant; rather, the court lays the groundwork for what could be an end-
less chain of tenancies and rescissions with no repair responsibility
ever being assumed by the landlord.88 Whether or not this takes
place depends in large measure on the attitude of the courts in evalu-
ating the reasonable value of occupying uninhabitable premises.89
full rent obligation is revived by the landlord's repair of the defects. 293
N.E.2d at 844-45.
86. This approach is contrary to traditional contract law under which no
party who has been guilty of the initial breach can sue for rescission based
on the other party's failure to perform. 12 WILLISTON § 1468.
87. There is case law to the effect that eviction subsequent to an attempt
to relieve grievances by using established procedures has been labeled "retal-
iatory." E.g., Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 863 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). Retaliatory eviction has been prohibited in a number of federal
decisions. E.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1016 (1969). See also McQueen v. Drucker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.
1972); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 239, § 9 (1967). It is obvious that it is
impossible to eliminate the potential for reprisal by the landlord entirely. For
example, even under the Javins rationale, once the landlord has lost his suit
for summary eviction, he is still free to seek eviction at the termination of the
lease term (which in many tenement dwellings is the next month) or "on any
other legal ground." 428 F.2d at 1083 n.64.
88. The only way to break the chain would be to make the failure to re-
pair unprofitable for the landlord. This might be achieved by holding the
lease contract void ab initio from the time the first tenant leaves the premises
because of a breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Brown v. South-
all Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968). But this does little to pro-
tect the possessory interest of the tenant. Another option is to prevent the land-
lord from releasing the dwelling until repairs have been undertaken. Robin-
son v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 855, 868-69 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
89. As a practical matter, it might be overly optimistic to believe that
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But it should be noted that, for many landlords, any return is satis-
factory as an alternative to further investment in what they consider
worthless properties. The rescission remedy seems particularly suited
to these landlords, who do not wish to "throw good money after
bad." 90
In denying possession to the tenant who complains of an unin-
habitable dwelling, the Hemingway court implicitly utilizes a fa-
miliar fiction: if the premises are uninhabitable, they obviously can-
not be lived in. Despite the court's protestations that it is not dealing
in such "legal fictions,"' this rescission of the lease bears a definite
resemblance to the remedy of constructive eviction. In its most
basic form, constructive eviction results in the termination of the obli-
gation to pay rent under a lease when there is an allegation that
the premises contain defects that are so grave as to constitute a depri-
vation of the possessory interest 'by the landlord.9 2  This allegation
must be accompanied by an actual abandonment of the premises. 93
In Hemingway, the tenants are compelled to surrender possession
after refusing to pay rent for an allegedly uninhabitable dwelling.
In addition, their rent obligation continues, at a reduced rate, to the
time of actual surrender.
The difference between the result under a theory of constructive
eviction and under the Hemingway rescission remedy is minimal.
The distinction between the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment
(the basis of the constructive eviction remedy) and the warranty of
habitability has become so blurred that a number of courts, whose
decisions are cited in Hemingway, have expressly equated the two
covenants.9 4  Both constructive eviction and rescission involve an
courts ingrained with the idea of the lease as a conveyance would be liberal
in assessing the loss to the tenant on account of premises that are in breach
of an implied warranty of habitability.
90. See G. STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 201 (1966).
91. 293 N.E.2d at 837.
92. The basis of the remedy of constructive eviction is a breach of the
implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. E.g., Milheim v. Baxter, 46 Colo. 155,
103 P. 376 (1909). One of the best statements regarding what constitutes a
breach of this covenant appears in Keating v. Springer, 146 M11. 481, 495, 34
N.E. 805, 808 (1893). There, a breach is said to consist of "acts of a grave
and permanent character, which amount to a clear indication of intent on the
landlord's part to deprive the tenant of the enjoyment of the demised premises."
93. See, e.g., Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-In-Action Corp., 340 Ill.
196, 172 N.E. 35 (1930). But see Majen Realty Corp. v. Glotzer, 61 N.Y.S.
2d 195 (New York Mun. Ct. 1946).
94. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1969), refers
to the distinction between the implied warranty of habitability and the cove-
nant of quiet enjoyment as being purely "a matter of semantics." Reste Re-
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election by the wronged party.95  Furthermore, there have been a
number of constructive eviction cases wherein the inability of the
tenant to abandon immediately has resulted in the court's charging
the tenant only the "reasonable value" of the leased premises prior
to actual abandonment. 96 In fact, so common has this remedy be-
come that it has attained the dignity of a legal doctrine, appropri-
ately named "equitable constructive eviction."'97 Finally, although
under Hemingway aggrieved tenants only are required to pay the
reasonable value of the premises up to abandonment, rather than the
full value, this does not distinguish the rescission remedy from that of
traditional constructive eviction. The facts, therefore, point to the
conclusion that the court in Hemingway, perhaps unwittingly, is re-
creating the duties and penalties incident to a remedy of constructive
eviction and enforcing them through a holding of dependent covi-
nants. 98 The court, in effect, is revitalizing an obsolete property
remedy by clothing it in the jargon of contract theory.
The policy rationale offered by the court in forcing the tenant
to surrender possession is somewhat more persuasive than is its
claim that it was applying contract law rather than property law.
The court suggests that it must consider the legislative policy under-
lying the present statutory remedy in fashioning alternative common
law remedies. 99 Indeed, it is a legitimate judicial function to en-
alty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 460, 251 A.2d 268, 276 (1969) states:
"[A] tenant's right to vacate leased premises is the same from a doctrinal
standpoint whether treated as stemming from breach of a covenant of quiet
enjoyment or from breach of any other dependent covenant."
95. The element of compulsion evident in Hemingway can be incorpo-
rated into the analysis by recognizing that the constructive eviction "election"
was built on the notion that the landlord had so frustrated the possessory inter-
est of the tenant as to constitute a command to abandon.
96. E.g., Charles E. Burt v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.
2d 4 (1959); see 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 28, § 3.52 n.4.
97. Note, Public Housing, 22 VAND. L. Rlv. 875, 977 (1969).
98. This may be seen as a reversal of the older common law trend of cre-
ating the duties of an implied warranty and enforcing them through a holding
of independent covenants and constructive eviction. Rapacz, Origin and Ev-
olution of Constructive Eviction in the United States, 1 DE PAUL L. REv. 69,
90 (1951). This result also reflects the changing role of constructive eviction,
which was first created to circumvent the common law's refusal to recognize
dependent covenants. Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a
Contract, 16 TExAs L. Rv. 47, 65 (1937). Constructive eviction has often
been the actual holding behind the stated theory of dependent covenants in the
sense that the fact situations before the courts have involved the actual aban-
donment of the premises pursuant to a claim of substandard conditions. See,
e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 462, 426 P.2d 470 (1969).
99. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. The majority, at least,
seems to give more force to the existence of the rent withholding statute than
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courage the use of specific statutory remedies.100 By so limiting
the remedial effect of the common law, the court provides a mea-
sure of relief to the tenant who, for whatever reason, did not pursue
his statutory remedy effectively, while insuring the continued viability
of the statutory remedy by making it the most attractive alternative
available to the aggrieved tenant.
Such a justification, however, fails for two reasons. First, the
Hemingway court repeatedly asserts that its purpose is to create rem-
edies that follow -the policy of the legislature, 1 1 to provide "defen-
sive" remedies, which 'give the tenant "freedom from the fear of be-
ing evicted."' 0 2 This policy is violated by the judicially mandated
eviction of tenants who pursue the common law rent withholding
remedy. A second -more damaging defect in the argument for a less
effective common law remedy is that, in the hierarchy of remedies
set forth 'by the court, the most beneficial remedy is still not statu-
tory. Statutory rent withholding effects a waiver of the reduction of
rent in return for the right to remain in possession. The common
law damage remedy, on the other hand, allows the tenant to recover
"some or all" of the rent paid as damages for the landlord's breach
while retaining possession.'08
To take advantage of the common law remedy, the tenant must
file suit for damages after faithful payment of the rent as provided
to the existence of the Sanitary Code. Where it is apparently justifiable to
create a common law warranty of habitability that extends beyond the legis-
lative standards of the Sanitary Code, any common law response to the rent
withholding must be of lesser force to encourage the use of the statutory rem-
edy. But see Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974), where the common law remedy offered by the court
far outstripped the legislative repair-and-deduct remedy available in California.
100. See Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 853-
54 n.3 (Mass. 1973): "As a matter of policy it is not desirable that a tenant
who does not avail himself of these statutory remedies be permitted to con-
tinue to occupy the landlord's premises indefinitely without paying the rent."
101. id. at 840.
102. The purpose of this amendment (MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 239,
§ 8A (Supp. 1974)) was to provide a -tenant with yet another means
of enforcing the state sanitary code or local health regulations, but
without the necessity for a timid tenant to initiate court proceedings
in what may appear to be a frightening system. Thus, the law now
arms the tenant with a defensive weapon-a shield to accompany his
sword.
Angevine & Taube, supra note 14, at 228, cited in part in Boston Housing Au-
thority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 840 (Mass. 1973).
103. 293 N.E.2d at 845 n.20. A portion of the rent reduction for insuffi-
cient services may be rebated to the landlord under an escrow system to effect
repairs in the dwelling.
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in the lease.104 Obviously, this contradicts the stated concern of the
court for defensive remedies. More important, however, is that this
remedy is not founded on dependent covenants theory at all; breach
of the landlord's covenant gives rise only to a separate cause of ac-
tion rather than to a right to withhold performance. This is the hall-
mark of the doctrine of independent covenants. 105 In other words,
Hemingway, which purports to apply contract doctrine to the lease
in the same manner as Javins did, guarantees that the only way that
the aggrieved tenant can receive a nonstatutory remedy substan-
tially equivalent to that offered in Javins-setoff against rent owed
plus retention of possession-is to seek relief in accord with the
rule of independent covenants. This, perhaps more than any other
factor, discredits the avowed adherence of the Hemingway court to
the theory of dependent covenants.
Any inquiry into the source of this divergence must first overcome
the barrier that many courts have been unable or unwilling to avoid
-uncritical reliance on standard terminology. Words like "con-
tract" and "property" and rules of "dependent" and "independent"
covenants offer only conclusions, which do little to reveal the source
of judicial reasoning. This fact is forcefully demonstrated by a
comparison of Javins and Hemingway. From the tenor of the Javins
opinion, it is evident that the court's choice of contract doctrine was
motivated by pragmatic rather than purely theoretical considera-
tions. Only contract doctrine, the court in Javins asserted, "allows
courts to ,be properly sensitive to all relevant factors in interpreting
lease obligations."'106 The factors recognized by the court in Javins
included the magnitude of the current housing shortage, the lack of
opportunity to repair on the part of the tenant, the development and
widening application of the area of products liability, and the unequal
bargaining power of the prospective tenant in the housing market.107
Under the fact situation in Hemingway, the rationale for looking
to these factors seems even more compelling because the aggrieved
104. Id. The minority sets forth an equivalent independent covenants rem-
edy. They state that on the occasion of the landlord's breach, the tenant may
"elect to remain in possession, paying the full amount of the agreed rent under
protest based on such violation, and then bring an action to recover the excess
of the amount over and above the fair value of the occupancy of the deficient
premise." Id. at 854.
105. See, e.g., Myles v. Strange, 226 AIa. 49, 145 S. 313 (1933); see also
1 AMRcAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 28, § 3.11; Patterson, Construc-
tive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L. Rnv. 903, 916 (1942).
106. 428 F.2d at 1075 n.13.
107. Id. at 1079.
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tenants occupied public housing.'08 In public housing the shortage
of available space is perhaps even more critical, 09 the opportunity
for tenant repair is less realistic, 10 and the reliance element, which
weighs so heavily in the consideration of the impact of products lia-
bility, is more prominent -than in private housing."' Moreover,
the disparity in bargaining power has traditionally been even more
pronounced in the public housing context. Standard residential
leases, long considered "grotesque in their one-sidedness" 1 2 in the
private sector, are widely considered more unconscionable in public
housing.0' 3 Public housing leases have long been punctuated with
cognovit notices, exculpatory clauses, waivers and similar devices,
108. It was only in a subsequent case, West Broadway Housing Task Force
v. Commissioner of Dep't of Community Affairs, 297 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass.
1973), that a court held that the tenant remedies embodied in Massachusetts
statutory law were equally available to tenants in public housing.
109. Of the six million public housing units that the federal government is
committed to build for low-income families, fewer than one million units had
been completed by the end of the 1971 fiscal year. SUBCOMM. ON HOUSING OF
THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 92D CONG., 1ST SESs., REPORT
ON HOUSING AND THE UREAN ENVIRONMENT 24 (Comm. Print 1971). Rois-
man, The Right to Public Housing, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 691, 700 (1971),
reports that "there has been some progress, but the fundamental problem re-
mains: there is not nearly enough public housing for those who need it." See
A STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL: THE BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY 1969-1973 [A
REPORT BY THE HOUSING TASK FORCE], Introduction-1 (1973).
110. The sheer size of the typical public housing project renders the costs
of systematic repairs prohibitive for any tenant, or for that matter, group of
tenants. The problem of repair funds is magnified by the fact that the resi-
dents of public housing are largely located in the lower economic brackets as
a result of express federal policy (42 U.S.C. § 1402 (Supp. 1974)). The re-
cently enacted Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, tit. II,
§§ 2, 3, 88 Stat. 653-54, reiterates this commitment. Thus, even small repairs
within the apartment may not be feasible. So-called repair-and-deduct reme-
dies (e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1974)) are, therefore, of little
use to the tenant of public housing. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616,
630-31, 517 P.2d 1168, 1177, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 713-14 (1974), suggests that
repair and deduct is likewise relatively worthless to the tenant in the private
housing market because of the limits on the amount of rent that may be de-
ducted and the number of times rent may be withheld.
111. Reliance is based largely on the lack of ability to control the condi-
tions of market transactions. In this regard, the typical public housing tenant
is powerless; he must rely on the public landlord because he has nowhere else
to turn. Indritz, The Tenant's Rights Movement, 1 N.M. L. REV. 1, 109
(1971).
112. Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 1000, 343 N.Y.S.2d
406, 411 (New York City Civ. Ct. 1971).
113. Schoshinski, Public Landlords and Tenants: A Survey of the Develop-
ing Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 399, 466-67.
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which drastically curtail the rights of tenants. 114 Although definite
steps have been taken to avoid such oppressive provisions,"1 5 it is
not clear whether these measures have had significant impact. In
any event it seems unlikely, given the time sequence, that these
steps had any effect upon the litigants in Hemingway.
The oppressiveness of a public housing tenancy, however, does
not arise from these factors alone. Compounding the inequities is
the fact that they exist and flourish under the aegis of the federal
government.1 16 Although public housing is the culmination of an
explicit federal commitment to offer better living environments, 1 1 7
114. Id.
115. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, PROHIBITION OF
CERTAIN PROVISIONS IN Low-RENT PUBLIC HOUSING LEASES, CmcULAR No.
RHM 7465.6 (1970).
116. Schoshinski, supra note 113, at 465-66. As Schoshinski sees it, all of
these factors operate to render the public housing lease "the epitome of a con-
tract of adhesion." Id. at 468. Comparison with any standard definition of
the contract of adhesion confirms Schoshinski's belief. E.g., Ehrenzweig, Ad-
hesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072, 1075
(1953): "[Contracts of adhesion are] agreements in which one party's par-
ticipation consists in his mere 'adherence,' unwilling and often unknowing, to
a document drafted unilaterally and insisted upon by what is usually a more
powerful enterprise."
117. The public housing in Hemingway was financed completely by federal
funds. Telephone conversation with Mr. George F. Mahoney, attorney for the
Boston Housing Authority in Hemingway, Friday, Jan. 18, 1974.
42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970) restated the federal commitment to housing in
terms very similar to those contained in the first federal housing legislation,
the United States Housing Act of 1937-that is, that the entire system of pub-
lic housing is designed to provide "decent housing" for every American family.
This commitment is renewed in the recently enacted Housing and Commu-
nity Development Act of 1974, tit. I, § 101 (d) (3), 88 Stat. 635. Under all fed-
eral legislation, the major part of the responsibility for operating subsidized
projects is delegated to local housing agencies, who theoretically serve as
nearly autonomous bodies. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970). See Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1974, tit. 11, § 2, 88 Stat. 653. The object of this
policy is to assure that the role of the housing authority approximates as closely
as possible the status of a private landlord. This autonomy is more theoretical
than real, however. Because of their dependence on the federal government for
funding, local housing authorities have always been accountable to the federal
government to a great extent. See 42 U.S.C. § 1415 (1970). Other controls
were added including the requirement of establishing "workable programs" as a
condition to receiving aid. 42 U.S.C. § 1451 (1970). Such programs were di-
rected at the general improvement of living conditions in public housing through
enforcement of housing codes and self-government by tenants. See generally
Rhyne, The Workable Program-A Challenge for Community Involvement, 25
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 685 (1960). The workable program (42 U.S.C. § 1451
(Supp. 1974)), has been whittled away by a number of legislative enactments,
particularly in the area of leased public housing. See 1969 U.S. CODE CONG.
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the officials who operate the system are largely unresponsive to ten-
ant grievances." 8 The relative passiveness of the federal govern-
ment appears to represent a condonation of the abuses. Thus, the
existing structure of federal public housing and the impotence of ten-
ants within it assures that public housing tenants will have not only
special problems, but also a "frustrating lack of ability to solve
them.""1
9
& AD. NEws 1541. A hybrid form of the workable program, however, has
reappeared in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, tit. I, §
104(a), 88 Stat. 639. In the interim, however, there has risen a potentially
more effective vehicle for increased control-the HUD circulars. See note 118
infra and accompanying text. So influential have these circulars become that
commentators are raising serious questions as to who actually controls the oper-
tions of public housing. Lefcoe, HUD's Authority to Mandate Tenants' Rights
in Public Housing, 80 YALE L.J. 463 (1970); Note, HUD's Authority to Man-
date Effective Management in Public Housing, 50 J. URBAN LAw 79 (1972);
see Housing Authority v. United States Housing Authority, 468 F.2d 1 (8th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973). However, up to now no formal
administrative measures have been developed through which the tenant could
realistically enforce the obligations imposed by these circulars. Note, Remedies
for Tenants in Substandard Public Housing, 68 CoLuM. L. REV. 561, 568
(1968). Moreover, because of lack of standing no single tenant has been able
to compel judicially the use of the potential sanctions available in the federal
program to improve substandard living conditions. Id. at 566-67. This protec-
tive buffer does, however, show some signs of breaking down. In Knox Hill
Tenant Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1971), it was held
that individual tenants had standing to litigate the issue whether the Department
of Housing and Urban Development had the responsibility to enforce the com-
mitment to "decent housing." See also Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 335 F.
Supp. 16, 26 (E.D. Mich. 1971):
In administering the Act [Housing and Urban Development Act of
1969] the Department of Housing and Urban Development must con-
tinuously assure that violations do not occur and must keep in mind
the central purpose of the Act, that is, the "realization as soon as
feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environ-
ment for every American family."
118. Genung, Public Housing-Success or Failure?, 39 GEo. WAsH. L. REV.
734, 748 (1971). In accordance with a HUD circular (U.S. DEPT OF Hous-
ING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE IN Low-RENT PUBLIC
HoUsING PRoJEcrs, CImCULAR No. RHM 7465.9 (1971)), the Boston Housing
Authority has responded to these problems by instituting a new "lease and
grievance procedure," which "establishes the right of the tenant who gets no
adequate response from the Authority where there is a severe maintenance
problem to withhold his rent." The procedure of the Boston Housing Author-
ity also establishes an "impartial hearing board of tenants and staff" to resolve
complaints. This approach, which may have resolved many of the problems
faced by the Hemingway court, did not become effective until Hemingway had
proceeded far into the appeal process. A STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL, supra note
109, at VI-14.
119. Indritz, supra note 111, at 109.
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Although the Hemingway court takes careful note of the factors
set out in Javins,1 20 neither the majority nor minority significantly
treats the public housing context.' 2' While -the court's reason for
this omission remains speculative, avoiding the public housing en-
vironment-and the pro-tenant sympathies it arouses-does allow
the court to look into the problems created by liberal tenant rem-
edies. Indeed, the Hemingway court seems to balance the immedi-
ate needs of the tenant against the ultimate need to avoid housing
standards so rigid and unfavorable from the landlord's point of view
as to cause him to abandon his building entirely. Although the
Javins decision rests on the tacit assumption that liability is imposed
upon an enterprise to encourage the development of a safer, better
enterprise, the court ignored the possibility that this causal model
could break down in the housing area simply because the imposition
of liability could act to decrease the availability of the target prod-
uct.'
22
Under the strict Javins approach, the residential landlord may
find himself in a much less favorable financial position. In form-
ulating a less drastic remedy, the Hemingway court seems cognizant
of the potential for increasing the existing housing shortage by an at-
tractive short-run response.'12 3  The landlord under the Hemingway
holding is immediately restored to possession of the premises upon
the tenant's decision to withhold rent; the court so responds "as a
matter of policy."'' 24 The nature of that policy seems clear: it is not
to develop in a vacuum more liberal defensive remedies, but rather
to establish compromise as an essential element of any remedy of-
fered to the residential tenant.
The origin of this fundamental policy of compromise is found in
the statutory rent withholding remedy. According to the statute, the
landlord stands to recover the full amount of rent withheld upon
remedying the defects in -the premises.' 25  This is a rather clear re-
jection of the contract principle that the wronged party be made
120. 293 N.E.2d at 841-42.
121. The concurring opinion refers to the fact that the Boston Housing Au-
thority is classified in the tenant's briefs as a "public body," but does not pur-
sue the matter further. 293 N.E.2d at 846.
122. See Sandier, Strict Liability and the Need for Legislation, 53 VA. L.
RFv. 1509, 1512 (1969).
123. See Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the
Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Pol-
icy, 80 YALE LJ. 1093, 1111-12 (1971). See generally O'Donnell, The
Rights of Landlords: Are They Threatened by Drive Against Slum Prop-
erty, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1964, at 16 col. 4.
124. 293 N.E.2d at 853-54 n.3.
125. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 239, § 8A (Supp. 1974).
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whole by the assessment of damages. The tenant certainly does not
receive all that -he bargained for under the lease and, in fact, he must
elect to forgo his normal remedy 126 for the opportunity to receive
the object of the original bargain. By supplying this "incentive to
repair,' 127 the hope is to make the performance of an obligation al-
ready contracted for an attractive alternative for the landlord.
Just as the Hemingway compromise is vulnerable to the vagaries
of the market and resourcefulness of the individual participants in a
dispute, so is the statutory rent withholding provision subject to-
abuse. Although the statute was passed with the intent "to promote
prompt repairs,"'1 28 it is doubtful whether it is capable of accom-
plishing that objective. The statutory rent withholding remedy only
serves to postpone the landlord's receipt of the entire rent obligation
until repairs are completed. Since the rent withholding statute is
silent on the period of time within which the landlord must repair
the premises to collect the full amount of rent upon repair, the land-
lord can recover all the withheld rent by repairing at his own con-
venience. In many cases, the landlord's need for funds will force
quick repair. However, for the landlord with a ready source of
capital, the knowledge that he will receive the full amount of rent
upon the completion of repairs, whenever 'he wishes to undertake
those repairs, might make him more apathetic toward this respon-
sibility.'2 9
126. The tenant's normal remedy would be a return of that amount of the
rent paid for benefits never received.
127. 293 N.E.2d at 844.
128. 293 N.E.2d at 845.
129. Withholding Rent: New Weapon Added to Arsenal for War on Slum-
lords, 21 J. HOUSING 67, 70 (1964); Schorr, Only As Much As The Rents Will
Bear, 24 J. HousING 33, 36 (1967). It should be noted that the landlords
who would be able to sustain themselves during a rent-less period are the en-
trepreneurial absentee landlords, who, in many cases, are the most flagrant of-
fenders of housing and health codes. See G. STERNLIEB, supra note 90, passim.
A wiser alternative to Massachusetts General Laws ch. 239, § 8A is
to exact a percentage deduction of the rent to be remitted for the time the
tenant had to tolerate an uninhabitable dwelling. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 23, §§ 11-23 (Supp. 1974). The sole concession that Hemingway makes
to the time element is the use of the period of uninhabitability as one of its
five criteria for evaluating the materiality of the breach of the implied war-
ranty of habitability. See note 41 supra. It should be noted that Javins pro-
vides a hedge against delay of repairs in the absence of a time limit statute.
The Javins holding implies that incidental and consequential damages may be
awarded for injuries suffered by the tenant or his family before repair, since
the court states it extends all contract remedies, including the extraordinary
remedy of specific performance. 428 F.2d at 1082 n.61.
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It cannot be denied, then, that the byproducts of the statutory
compromise may be undesirable in a given situation; however, such
results are not an indication that the compromise approach is
untenable. Under the statute the landlord has made a substantial
concession since the tenant continues to occupy the premises with-
out paying rent. This element of bargaining is a device whose merits
even the most outspoken adversaries of the urban slumlord are
forced to recognize.' 3 0  Unfortunately, what the Hemingway court
offers in an attempt to fulfill the policy of the legislature is not a
compromise in the true sense of the word. All its terms are dic-
tated by the needs of the landlord, rather than by a rational bal-
ancing of the interests of both landlord and tenant. As a result, the
tenant is subjected to the pitfalls of compromise while reaping none
of the benefits.
The severity of this result from the tenant's point of view also
raises grave doubts as to the future directions of landlord-tenant law.
The court's noncommittal attitude toward the public housing con-
text in which Hemingway arose is particularly ominous. In contrast
to the situation in the private sector, the interests of the landlord
and the tenant in public housing are, conceptually, at least, far from
adverse. 13 1 Attitudes are not polarized by the profit motive, as they
130. Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REv. 869, 920
(1967). In what is a rather harsh indictment of the slum landlord, the au-
thors interject: "lilt is to be hoped that the slum housing market can be
brought to its knees relatively gradually, so that the legislatures may have some
time to act before a great many landlords are immediately threatened."
131. This is not meant to indicate that many of the same forces that move
the private landlord to demand concessions from his tenants are not equally
crucial in public housing. Basically, both public and private landlords are
faced with the very substantial financial challenge of meeting increased repair
responsibilities after a long period of dependency on a pattern of neglect of
maintenance. A STRUGGLE FOR SuRVIVAL, supra note 109, at 1-3, notes that
since 1964, operating expenses have risen some 40 percent. See generally F.
DELEEuW, OPERATING COSTS ni PuBLic HousING: A FINANCIAL CRisis (1970).
To appreciate the dimensions of the maintenance problem in public hous-
ing, it is necessary to get an overview of the budgetary structure of federal
public housing. For an extended period of time, the federal government ex-
tended aid sufficient to cover only the capital expenditures of public housing.
Operating costs were covered by the rent of the tenants. It was recognized
that this budget had to be closely watched in order that the costs be kept low
to accommodate those most in need of public housing. Thus, the approach
of public housing agencies was simply to neglect making substantial repairs to
keep operating costs within reason. Legislative measures have been passed in
recent years to provide extra funds. 42 U.S.C. § 1468 (1970) was the first
such measure. Apparently, however, it did not have the anticipated impact;
in the new Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, several meas-
ures have been set forth to provide extra funds for both extraordinary and rou-
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are in the private sector.13 2  Because the aims of public housing
legislation are community aims, it is only logical to expect the courts
to attempt to maintain that conceptual difference. If the Heming-
way court discerns a compelling need to effect a one-sided com-
promise in the public housing context, quaere the extent to which a
court similarly motivated would -go "as a matter of policy" to satisfy
the private landlord.
A more balanced resolution of the problem before the Heming-
way court could be reached by recognizing the integrity of both of
the landlord's covenants-to transfer possessory rights and to pro-
vide a habitable dwelling. 133 The best vehicle for such a strategy is
to interpret the residential lease as a divisible contract with separate
consideration allocated to the separate obligation of the landlord-
to transfer a physical space and to maintain that space.134
tine repairs. It is strongly suggested that the breadth of federal aid given by
way of the annual fund allocation (The Annual Contributions Contract) may
be subject to a case-by-case approach depending upon the peculiar condition
of federal housing in question. The cost of operation is specifically listed as
one factor to be considered in funding in the Act, tit. H, § 5(b), 88 Stat.
657.
132. In a private housing market, the profits of the landlord are a limita-
tion on any duty imposed on the landlord. See Note, The Plight of the Indi-
gent Tenant: The Failure of the Law to Provide Relief, 5 Sus'oIz L. Rnv.
213, 220 (1970). Liberal tenant remedies are based on the "questionable as-
sumption that the slum landlord can be compelled to rehabilitate his own prop-
erty and still further his own goal." G. STPNLm, supra note 90, at 88, suggests
that the return to the slumlord, though not insubstantial (about 10-12 percent)
must compensate him for more than his investment. It must pay him for the
less-than-exalted position of the slumlord in society and the risks inherent in
the trade. Id. at 95-96. See also Kahn, We Need More Slumlords, SATURDAY
EvNINo PosT, Dec. 17, 1966, at 8.
It should be mentioned that studies on landlord profits necessarily focus
on the successes in the market, the survivors. All indications are that they
are becoming a vanishing breed. See generally Fried, Worsening of Slum
Housing Abandonment is Feared, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at 1, col. 4. The
recently enacted Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 refers to
this dangerous trend. Among Congress's most significant findings in consid-
ering the bill were "that the deterioration and abandonment of housing for the
Nation's lower income families has accelerated over the last decade, and that
this acceleration has contributed to neighborhood disintegration ... " Tit.
VIII, § 801(b), 88 Stat. 721.
133. See note 31 supra.
134. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra. The proposal for divisibil-
ity of the lease contract is to be contrasted with divisibility characterized by
the mere periodic nature of payments under the typical residential lease.
This latter brand of divisibility is addressed to the economic convenience of
the tenant and is not responsive to the tenant's need to retain possession, on
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A divisible contract approach is desirable because of its ability
to reconcile pragmatic and theoretical considerations surrounding the
residential tenancy. The status of components of the residential
lease seems to be perfectly consistent with the definition of the di-
visible contract:
The essential test to determine whether a number of prom-
ises constitute one contract or more than one is simple. It
can be nothing else than the answer to an inquiry whether
the parties assented to all the promises as a single whole,
so that there would have been no bargain whatever, if any
promise or set of promises were struck out.'3 5
It might -be deduced from the preeminence of the possessory inter-
est' 36 that the low-income tenant in today's housing market would,
in many cases, accept the lease without the assumption by the land-
lord of an obligation to maintain habitable premises. In other
words, there would be a bargain notwithstanding the absence of a
duty to repair on the part of the landlord. Thus, the obligation to
transfer possession could be construed as divisible from the obliga-
tion to maintain habitable premises. The only obstacle to such a con-
struction is that the landlord's covenants are not divided by the terms
of the lease. This -problem is easily overcome, however, since ju-
dicial precedent has firmly established the power of the courts to in-
quire into whether divisibility is authorized by the terms of a con-
tract when it is not expressly set forth in the form of the con-
tract.'37 Moreover, construing the lease as a divisible contract more
accurately reflects the method by which the landlord fixes the lease
price. In fact, although separate considerations are not recited in
the lease the typical landlord does accord separate considerations to
the possessory interest and maintenance services when figuring a
lease price.' 38
. A more important reason for construing the lease as a divisible
contract is the practical value of the theory for resolving the conflict-
the one hand, and the landlord's need for a guaranteed return on his invest-
ment while he is allegedly in breach of his obligations under the lease contract.
135. 6 WILLISTON § 863.
136. See notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Producer's Coke Co. v. Hillman, 243 Pa. 313, 316, 90 A.
144 (1914); cf. REsTATBmENT or? CoNTRAcrs § 266, comment f (1932).
This principle is well-settled in transactions involving the sale of goods. UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-612. See also id., Comment 1.
138. Quinn & Phillips, The Lawv of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evalua-
tion of the Past With Guidelines for the Future, 38 FoRDHAm L. RPv. 225,
253-54 (1969).
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ing interests of the landlord and the tenant. If the obligation to re-
frain from disturbing the possessory interest and the obligation to re-
pair were not considered inextricable, the landlord would always re-
ceive the value of the possessory interest if the tenant remained in
occupancy, even when the premises were uninhabitable. Indeed, if
we are to believe the landlord, the basis of his grievance is not the
tenant's retention of the possessory interest, but rather his own need
for ready funds to meet expenses, to perform needed repairs and to
show a profit.139 If this desire is satisfied by the continuing flow
of funds in payment for the possessory interest, it should be the only
concession necessary to keep the landlord in the housing market.
There is no reason to make possession, -the most critical element of
the lease transaction, a negotiable item in the effort to reach a com-
promise.
Unfortunately, economic conditions have frustrated this proposal.
Today divisibility and the assurance of the availability of that portion
of rent allocated to the possessory interest may not offer a sufficient
economic cushion to the landlord. As the costs of repairs and other
services rise, the consideration allocated to the possessory interest
seems destined to shrink to the point where the income from the
possessory interest would be inadequate to maintain the dwelling at
even the most minimal level of repair, much less fulfill the landlord's
desire to realize some return on his investment. Thus, there should
be, upon the occasion of any jury trial on a question of rent with-
holding, mandatory provision for deposits into court of the exact
amount of rent due for the service functions under the lease.' 40 The
funds should be made available to the landlord under the scrutiny of
the court.14 ' Such a tactic seems to be in accord with contract
theory since, in the typical dependent covenants situation, no action
by the wronged party will lie until he himself has performed or of-
fered to perform his own covenant.' 42 The object of the proposal is
139. See Committee on Leases, Trends in Landlord-Tenant Law Including
Model Code, 6 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST J. 550, 588-89 (1971).
140. But cf. Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 484 (D.C. Cir.
1970). The court suggests that deposit of the full rent may not be required
if the tenant makes a "very strong showing" of uninhabitability.
141. Escrow funds are not favored since they typically are not within the
domain of the court. The sporadic nature of the expenses incident to the op-
eration of a residential structure demands accessibility of the funds.
142. 3 CoRIN § 658; see UNIFoRM COMMERCuAL CODE § 2-609. See also
Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1970):
[N]ormally the burden of such a prepayment order on the tenant will
be neither heavy nor unexpected: to require that the tenant meet cur-
rent rental payments during the litigation period is to require only
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to offer the landlord, as well as the tenant, a predictable remedy.
This is the only means of assuring that the financial security of the
landlord and the retention of possession by the tenant will be com-
patible.
The decision in Hemingway exposes some heretofore concealed
issues in landlord-tenant law and ignores some obvious ones. It
does little to aid the plight of the modern residential tenant. 143 In-
deed, the merger of contract theory and legislative policy which the
court proposes carries the potential for even more damaging effects
in the long run. The common law warranty of habitability provides
still more variables to consider in an area of the law that has long
been uniquely susceptible to confusion and a lack of predictabil-
ity.144 More importantly, the court's disregard for the significance
of the possessory interest seems to conflict with the essential dual-
ity145 of the residential lease transaction as both a contract and a con-
veyance.
KEviN A. CUDNEY
that he fulfill an obligation which he voluntarily assumed at an ear-
lier date when he entered into the lease.
But cf. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
143. The court implies, however, that the decision it reaches will have far-
reaching effects for the residential tenant. The majority states that it does
"not purport to forecast all the changes that will arise from our new common
law rule." 293 N.E.2d at 843 n.14.
144. See Committee on Leases, supra note 139, at 555.
145. "[-]t is idle to speculate whether the land or the promise is the prin-
ciple element of a lease of an apartment with a promise to furnish heat ....
The bargain is for both. If the warp is conveyance, the woof is contract and
neither alone makes a whole cloth." 1 AMFRICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra
note 28, § 3.11.
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